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Myopic Rationality in a Mania 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The rationality of investors during asset price bubbles has been the subject of considerable 
debate. An analysis of the British Railway Mania, which occurred in the 1840s, suggests that 
investors may have been myopic, as their expectations were only accurate in the short-term, 
but they remained rational, as they acted in a utility maximising manner given their 
expectations. Investors successfully incorporated forecasts of short-term dividend changes 
into their valuations, but were unable to predict longer-term changes.  When short-term 
growth is controlled for, it appears that the railways were priced consistently with the non-
railways throughout the entire episode.  
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Asset price reversals have been a feature of financial markets for many centuries, with 
periods such as the Tulip Mania, the South Sea Bubble, and the Wall Street Crash being 
prominent examples. The ‘Dot-Com Bubble’ and ‘Housing Bubble’ have led to a renewed 
interest in such episodes, with popular commentary often associating them with irrationality 
and mispricing. However, economists have tended to seek explanations in terms of rational 
behaviour. 
To analyse this issue it is helpful to differentiate between what investors expected, and how 
they acted given those expectations. One approach to examining a bubble episode has been to 
focus on whether prices were similar to some assessment of a rational expectation, which in 
many cases resolves into a discussion of investors’ lack of foresight, and why they regarded 
this time as being different. Such an analysis is usually a consideration of whether investor 
expectations were myopic, meaning that they focussed on the short-term, and were unable to 
form accurate forecasts of the long-term. 
However, it may also be insightful to consider investor behaviour in terms of procedural 
rationality, which considers whether investors maximised their utility, given their subjective 
expectations. Investors may be regarded as rational if they ensured that at any time each asset 
reflected only their expectations of the sum of discounted cash flows. This would imply that 
each asset was priced consistently with other assets, after controlling for investor 
expectations of fundamental factors such as dividends, growth and risk. By extension, assets 
in one industry should have been priced consistently with other industries, after accounting 
for such factors. Using this definition, it is possible that investors were both myopic, as their 
expectations may have been short-sighted, and rational, as their actions given those 
expectations were utility maximising. 
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This paper argues that in an historical asset price reversal, known as the British Railway 
Mania, investors had this combination of myopia and rationality. During this episode, which 
occurred in the 1840s, and which the Economist (2008) has referred to as ‘arguably the 
greatest bubble in history’, the prices of railway shares changed substantially. A new dataset 
has been collected from primary sources for this analysis, which consists of weekly stock 
price and dividend data for every railway that was listed and operating during this period, and 
a sample of non-railway companies. 
The myopia of investor foresight is considered by analysing the relationship between share 
prices and future dividend growth. The results suggest that companies with a relatively low 
dividend yield generally went on to experience higher dividend growth during the next few 
years, as would be expected from standard asset pricing theory. However, there is little 
evidence of higher longer-term dividend growth, which may imply that investors had 
imperfect foresight, and were only able to forecast short-term dividend changes. 
The rationality, or consistency, of pricing is analysed in a series of 417 cross-sectional 
regressions, one for each week of the period between 1843 and 1850, relating the cross-
sectional variation in dividend yields to future growth and risk. The inclusion of a dummy 
variable distinguishes the differences between railway stocks, which experienced a 
substantial price reversal, and non-railway assets, which did not. When future growth is not 
controlled for, the railways appear to have had significantly higher share prices than the non-
railways for a total of 80 weeks. However, when several years of future growth are controlled 
for, this apparent overpricing is entirely eliminated. These results suggest that given 
investors’ myopic expectations, they acted rationally by pricing the railways consistently with 
other assets. 
3 
 
The sources of myopia are then discussed, by considering the short dividend history of the 
railways, the heterogeneity of opinion in the media, and why investors failed to predict the 
changes in economic growth, the widespread expansion of the railway network, and the 
revelation of accounting manipulation which eventually occurred. Ex-ante, the negative 
impact of these changes was difficult to forecast, which allowed asset prices to initially 
increase. It was only when new information became available that investors revised their 
expectations, leading to share price declines. 
The analysis in this paper expands our understanding of why asset price reversals occur. 
Previous research has suggested that factors such as irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2005), the 
widespread adoption of new technology (Pástor and Veronesi, 2009), limits to arbitrage 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Ofek and Richardson, 2003, Abreu and Brunnerheimer, 2003), 
and ‘riding a bubble’ (Blanchard and Watson, 1983, and Temin and Voth, 2004) may 
contribute to the rise and fall of asset prices. This paper suggests that myopic rationality may 
also play a considerable role in such episodes with investors pricing assets consistently given 
the available information, but their expectations were primarily based on what would happen 
in the short-term.   
These arguments are related to the concept of an ‘intrinsic bubble’ (Froot and Obstfeld, 
1991), which suggests that investors over-react to dividend changes. However, this paper 
argues that it is not so much an over-reaction to past dividend changes, as myopic 
expectations of future dividend changes, which is of importance. Prices moved in advance of 
dividends throughout the Mania, suggesting that investors were using a range of information 
to predict future growth, rather than responding to experienced dividend announcements. 
Myopia has been offered as a possible explanation for the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi 
and Thaler, 1995), but it has not been developed as a reason for bubble episodes. 
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More generally, this paper contributes to the body of research on historical asset price 
bubbles, such as the long-term analysis of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and the episode 
specific research on periods such as the Tulip Mania of 1636 (Garber, 2001), the South Sea 
Bubble of 1720 (Dale et al., 2005) the German stock market boom of 1927 (Voth, 2003), the 
Wall Street boom of the late 1920s (Donaldson and Kamstra, 1996), and the Nasdaq bull 
market of the 1990s (Pástor and Veronesi, 2006). The analysis in this paper particularly adds 
to existing research on the Railway Mania from Odlyzko (2010) who has argued that it was 
an example of market inefficiency, from Bryer (1991) and Arnold and McCartney (2003) 
who have debated whether it was a ‘swindle’ designed to expropriate investors, and from 
Casson (2009), who has discussed how it resulted in the inefficient duplication of railway 
lines and overexpansion of the network. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 examines the related literature on the definition 
of bubbles, Section 2 provides a brief background to the Railway Mania, Section 3 discusses 
the data used, whilst Section 4 estimates the movement in stock prices and dividends during 
this period. Section 5 considers investor foresight, Section 6 examines the cross-sectional 
relationship between prices, growth and risk, Section 7 examines the pricing of the new 
railways, Section 8 discusses the sources of myopia during this episode, Section 9 considers 
the relationship of myopia to other theories, with Section 10 being a brief conclusion.  
1 Bubbles and Rationality 
As noted by O’Hara (2008), there has been some ambiguity about the meaning of the term 
bubble, with previous academic literature generally using two definitions. The popular usage 
of the term, per Kindleberger (2000, p.16), is an ‘upward price movement over an extended 
range that then implodes’, or what Bordo and Jeanne (2002) have described as an ‘asset price 
reversal’. By using this first definition it is relatively easy to detect and label a bubble ex-
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post, simply by an observation of nominal prices. As will be demonstrated below, the 
Railway Mania can be classed as a bubble using this criteria, as there was a considerable 
stock price reversal during this period. 
However, the economic definition of a bubble is a deviation from fundamental value (Flood 
and Hodrick, 1990, p.88). This occurs when the price of an asset is different from its 
discounted sum of cash flows. The detection of irrational pricing is still controversial as 
fundamental value is not necessarily observed directly, making it difficult to conclude that 
prices have diverged from this value. Two broad approaches have been taken to deal with this 
difficulty. Neither of these approaches are definitive tests of whether a bubble did or did not 
exist, but they do provide insights into the characteristics of suspected bubble episodes. 
One approach has been to focus on expectations, by considering whether the forecasts of 
growth or uncertainty implied by asset prices were unrealistic (see Pástor and Veronesi, 2006, 
and Voth, 2003). Various econometric tests have also been proposed for the detection of 
bubbles, including variance bound tests (Shiller, 1981), the comparison of the ‘actual’ 
relationship and a theoretical ‘constructed’ relationship between prices and dividends (West, 
1987), co-integration tests which determine the orders of integration of prices and dividends 
(Diba and Grossman, 1988) and the relationship between the dividend yield and the level of 
dividends (Froot and Obstfeld, 1991). This paper considers the accuracy of investor foresight 
during the Railway Mania by examining the relationship between prices and future growth. It 
concludes that investors were myopic, with accurate short-term forecasts, but inaccurate 
longer-term forecasts. 
Another approach has been to consider whether investors acted rationally by pricing assets 
consistently. Dale et al. (2005) have argued that several assets issued by the South Sea 
6 
 
company were not priced consistently with each other. Lamont and Thaler (2003) have found 
that during the Dot-Com Bubble the pricing of technology stock carve-outs violated the law 
of one price. In the context of the Railway Mania, it could be argued that if investors were 
rational and a bubble did not exist, the railways should have been priced consistently with the 
non-railways. Consistency of pricing would suggest that railway stock prices were 
determined by the same fundamental factors as non-railway stock prices, whilst inconsistency 
could suggest an irrational preference for the railways. This paper goes on to test the 
consistency of pricing during the Railway Mania by analysing whether railway stock prices 
were significantly different from other industries, after controlling for growth and risk. It 
argues that given investors’ myopic expectations, the railways were priced consistently with 
other assets. 
2 Background to Railway Mania 
The first modern passenger railway was the Liverpool and Manchester, which was promoted 
in 1824, authorised by Parliament in 1826, and opened in 1830. Over the subsequent decade 
about another sixty railways were constructed, with most of the lines projected during a 
minor promotion boom in 1836 and 1837. However, further promotion was subdued until the 
early 1840s. A period known as the Railway Mania then ensued, with share prices rising 
substantially from 1843 to 1845, and then falling steadily until 1850.  
The initial phase of the Mania was associated with strong economic growth, and a low rate of 
interest, with 3 per cent Consols, government debt perpetuities, reaching par for the first time 
for over a century (Economist, April 13, 1844, p.674). A widespread reduction in fares, 
combined with the economic conditions, produced a rapid increase in passenger numbers and 
revenues for the railways. Between 1843 and 1846, first class traffic on the ten largest 
railways increased by 33 per cent, whilst second class and third class traffic increased by 68 
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per cent and 187 per cent respectively. This resulted in an overall increase in passenger 
receipts of 41 per cent, whilst receipts from goods traffic also increased, by 42 per cent 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1847, LXIII, p.179). These increases in traffic and receipts were 
achieved with a relatively small increase of 25 per cent in the mileage open of the largest 
lines. 
The downturn in asset prices, beginning in the autumn of 1845, coincided with the discovery 
of a potato blight, and defective harvest, which led to an economic downturn, the repeal of 
the Corn Laws, and the Irish Famine. A financial crisis then followed in 1847, which 
involved distress amongst many banks and merchants, and led to a further reduction in 
economic growth (Evans, 1849). 
The initial falls in share prices also followed a dramatic increase in the promotion of new 
railway lines, which reached unprecedented levels in the autumn of 1845. Some estimates 
suggested that over one thousand new railways were promoted at this time (The Times, 
November 17, 1845, p.4). Those lines which Parliament authorised were constructed during 
the latter half of the decade, leading to a substantial expansion in the railway network. These 
new lines exposed existing railways to the threat of competition, and tended to earn lower 
returns on capital.  
Between 1847 and 1850 railway receipts continued to rise, with an increase of 17 per cent in 
passenger receipts for the ten largest railways, and a rise of 101 per cent in receipts from 
transporting goods, which resulted in an overall increase in receipts of 44 per cent 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1851, LI, p.229). However, the mileage open amongst these ten 
largest railways had more than doubled, rising by 110 per cent, and the resulting increase in 
operating expenses and issue of equity reduced the dividends per share. 
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Commentary throughout the period suggested that dividends were regarded as an important 
consideration in the valuation of railway stocks. For example, the Economist (November 8, 
1845, p.1109) noted that ‘with regard to the finished and dividend paying lines, they are of 
course calculated so as to yield a given rate of interest which must always have some 
reference to the rate which other securities yield, and so far the price of shares should 
fluctuate with other securities.’ Similarly, an investment pamphlet entitled the Short and Sure 
Guide to Railway Speculation advised that ‘as regards the purchase of shares in the 
established lines we have simply to compare the market price of the share with the dividend 
which it pays’ (Anon., 1845, pp.5-6). It went on to note that ‘taking the value of money at 
four per cent, the shares in a railway which pays six per cent per annum are worth £150 each; 
or in one which pays ten per cent they are worth £250 each. If bought below these prices, the 
purchaser is receiving, pro tanto, a better rate than four per cent, and he will accept this better 
rate, in proportion to any doubt he may have with respect to the dividend being maintained.’ 
3 Data 
To improve our understanding of the Railway Mania, a unique and comprehensive dataset 
has been constructed, by inputting the original share price tables published in a weekly 
newspaper, the Railway Times, between 1843 and 1850. The share price dataset was 
supplemented with data on dividends, collected from the Course of the Exchange, an official 
stockbroker list for the London stock market, and from supplementary tables in the Railway 
Times. As this paper focuses entirely on those companies which were capable of paying 
dividends during the boom, only the railways in operation at the beginning of the Mania, and 
the firms which resulted from mergers involving these lines, are included. The pricing of the 
new railways are considered in Section 7. 
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There were 64 railways listed in the Railway Times in the first week of 1843. However, there 
was dividend data on only 39 of these railways. Due to a high number of mergers and 
acquisitions, the number of railway companies fell throughout the sample. If an established 
railway, in existence at the start of 1843, participated in a merger then the new company was 
also treated as an established railway and it was assumed that investors in the original 
company went on to receive the dividend of the merged firm. By the end of 1850 there were 
25 established railways listed in the Railway Times, and dividend data was available for 22 of 
these railways.  
Data on the 22 largest non-railway companies by market capitalisation was also obtained 
from the Course of the Exchange. The sample includes Bank of England stock, India stock, 
six banks, five insurance companies, three canals, three docks, two gas, light, and coke 
companies, and one waterworks company included. These companies represented 70.2 per 
cent of total non-railway market capitalization at the beginning of 1843, suggesting that they 
give a good representation of the overall market.   
The number of shares in issue (N), the share price (P), the par value (Z), and the dividend (D) 
for each of the securities was recorded for each of the 417 weeks in the sample period. The 
logs of each variable are expressed in lower case letters. To enable the analysis of dividend 
changes beyond the main sample period the dividend rates of companies until 1856 were 
included in the dataset. 
Fama and French (1992) suggest that risk dimensions can be proxied by beta, size and book-
to-market variables. Rather than using portfolio formation, the beta and size of each firm has 
been controlled for directly by including these variables in the regressions, due to the 
relatively small number of companies involved in this sample. The beta (B) of each firm has 
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been estimated for each company for the 52 weeks preceding the end of each year, by 
regressing the weekly returns of each asset minus the risk free rate, against the weekly returns 
of the market portfolio minus the risk free rate. The market portfolio has been approximated 
by the non-railways’ market index, which is likely to be more representative of a portfolio of 
all assets than a stock market index which is dominated by the railways. It is also consistent 
with the approach of Pástor and Veronesi (2009) when calculating the beta of the early US 
railroads. For robustness the beta has also been re-calculated using a market portfolio 
consisting of both the railways and non-railways, and results using both estimates of beta are 
reported. The results are generally similar and do not affect the conclusions. The risk-free rate 
has been approximated by the yield on 3 per cent Consols. 
The size (S) of the company has been measured as the total par value of the firm, calculated 
as the number of shares in issue multiplied by the par value of each share, and expressed in 
£millions. The par value of a share was the total amount of equity which shareholders had 
paid to the company for that security, and is considered as a proxy for book value. As another 
measure of pricing relative to fundamentals will be used in the following analysis, namely the 
dividend yield, the book-to-market variable is not considered. A railway dummy variable (R) 
has also been created, which equals one when the company was a railway, and zero 
otherwise. 
Only those companies which had been traded, and had an observable share price, could be 
included in the analysis, which reduced the sample size slightly. This was most pronounced at 
the beginning of the sample with eleven companies not being traded at all during 1843. 
During the remainder of the period an average of 4.8 companies could not be included as they 
had not traded. As a zero dividend yield does not reveal any information about pricing, an 
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average of 3.0 observations had to be excluded due to some established companies not paying 
a dividend. The pricing of these zero dividend companies will be considered in Section 7. 
The average number of companies analysed each week in the cross-sectional regressions was 
41.8, which involved a total of 17,412 observations over the sample. When periods of future 
dividend growth are included, these figures are reduced slightly due to data availability. For 
regressions involving two years of dividend growth the average number of companies was 
36.9, and for those involving six years of dividend growth there was an average of 33.5 
companies. 
4 Movement of Stock Prices and Dividends 
Weekly market indices for the established railway companies and the non-railway companies, 
for which share price and dividend data are available, have been constructed and are plotted 
in Figure 1. In each case the market return has been calculated on a weekly basis by 
weighting the capital gains of each company by its market capitalisation at the end of the 
preceding week. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>> 
The index representing the established railways rose from a base of 1,000 in January 1843 to 
a peak of 1,717 on August 8, 1845, but the non-railways index had risen to just 1,158 by this 
time. The established railway index then fell substantially, declining by 18.4 per cent by the 
end of November 1845, whilst the non-railways fell by 4.3 per cent during the same period. 
The established railway index then stabilised throughout 1846, before beginning a steady 
decline from January 1847 onwards, with the sample ending in 1850 with the established 
railway index at 734, and the non-railway index at 1,126.  
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Figure 2 illustrates the weekly return on established railway shares, showing that the boom 
period of the Mania was characterised by moderate, positive, returns. Volatility tended to be 
higher during the downturn, particularly during the initial decline in prices in the autumn of 
1845, and during 1848 when there were concerns about the impact of the French Revolution, 
and the amount of construction which the railways were undertaking. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
Whilst the prices of railway shares changed dramatically, railway dividends also rose and fell 
substantially. As can be seen from Figure 3, the dividends, as a percentage of par value, paid 
by established railways at the beginning of 1843 averaged 4.4 per cent. They then increased 
steadily, reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in July 1847, before falling to just 2.9 per cent by the 
end of 1850. Higher dividends were evident in almost every one of the major railways during 
the boom, and dividend declines were almost universal during the downturn. The dividends 
paid by the non-railways were much less volatile, beginning 1843 at an average of 7.2 per 
cent, and remaining close to this level for most of the period, except during 1847 and 1848 
when the average was raised by a higher Bank of England dividend rate. The peak in railway 
share prices occurred almost two years before the peak in railway dividends, perhaps 
suggesting that investors were including estimates of future dividend changes into prices 
before the rates had actually changed. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
The dividend/price ratios of the railway and non-railway industries are plotted in Figure 4. 
The railway industry dividend yield has been calculated as the total dividends paid by all the 
established railways as a fraction of the total market capitalisation of those railways, with the 
non-railways calculated in a similar manner. At the beginning of 1843 the dividend yields of 
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the railway and non-railway industries were close, being 4.6 per cent and 4.3 per cent 
respectively. Although railway prices and dividends both rose and then fell during the sample 
period, prices seem to have moved in advance of dividends, resulting in a changing dividend 
yield. The railway industry dividend yield initially fell, reaching a minimum of 3.3 per cent in 
February 1844, but then rose substantially, reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in October 1848.  
During the same period, the non-railway industry dividend yield remained between 3.7 and 
4.8 per cent. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 4>> 
Total return indices have also been constructed, which combine both capital gains and 
dividends, and are shown in Figure 5. The established railways total return index reached a 
peak of 1,898 in August 1845, and ended the sample period at a level of 1,067, implying that 
even after dividends have been included the total return to investors in established railways 
was close to zero between 1843 and 1850. In contrast, the non-railways reached a level of 
1,566 in 1850, which was the peak for the sample period. 
<<INSERT FIGURE 5>> 
Descriptive statistics for each of the key variables included in the subsequent regression 
analysis have been reported in Table 1, by industry and by year. The mean dividend yield of 
the railways shows more change over time than that of the non-railways, with the railways 
having a relatively lower yield from the end of 1843 to 1846, before a dramatic rise gave 
them a relatively higher yield from 1847 to 1849. For the railways, dividends grew 
consistently during the boom, but then declined by an average of over 30 per cent per year, 
for two years during the downturn, which was much more volatile than the non-railways. The 
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standard deviation of dividend changes was also greater amongst the railways than the non-
railways in every year of the sample. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1>> 
The size variable, reported in Table 1, reveals that the average par value of non-railways was 
greater than that of the railways at the start of the period, although much of this was due to 
the size of the Bank of England. Throughout the Mania the railways continued to expand, but 
the non-railways remained relatively stable, resulting in the railways ending the sample 
period an average of over three times as large. The average beta of the railways based on a 
market portfolio of non-railway shares, peaked in 1845, whilst the beta based on a market 
portfolio of railways and non-railways had peaks in 1844 and 1850.  
5 Investor Foresight 
To analyse pricing during the Railway Mania a standard asset pricing relationship is 
considered, based on the traditional Gordon (1962) dividend growth model. Although the 
relationship between dividends and price is linear in this model, the relationship with the 
other variables, namely the discount and growth rates, is non-linear. To avoid this problem 
Campbell and Shiller (1988, p. 201) have proposed the dividend ratio model, or ‘dynamic 
Gordon model’, shown in Equation 1, which is linear in logs. This expresses the log of the 
dividend-price ratio (δ) as the expected discounted value of future discount rates (r) and 
dividend growth rates (∆d), with several terms which can be treated as constants (ρ, c, and k). 
ρ is the average ratio of the price to the sum of the price and the dividend, c is the risk 
premium in stock returns, and k is a term which makes the equation hold in levels. 
15 
 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 ≈  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗∞
𝑗𝑗=0
�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 − ∆𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗� + 𝑐𝑐 − 𝑘𝑘1 − 𝜌𝜌 (1) 
The rest of this paper uses this relationship to examine both investor foresight, and the 
consistency of pricing, during the Railway Mania. One approach to considering the accuracy 
of investor foresight has been to illustrate the association between two of the variables from 
Equation 1, namely the dividend yield and future dividend growth, as per Campbell and 
Shiller (1998). Figure 6 plots the relationship between the log of the dividend yield and the 
dividend growth for railway companies between t and t + 1 year, for each company in the 
sample, with one observation per company at the end of each year of the sample. The 
negative correlation, of -0.650, implies that companies with a low dividend yield, meaning a 
relatively high price, went on to experience relatively higher growth during the subsequent 
year.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 6 >> 
Table 2 reports fixed effects panel regressions which explain future dividend growth, for a 
range of horizons, using the log of the dividend yield, controlling for beta and size. There is 
one observation for each railway company, for the end of each year. The results suggest that a 
low dividend yield was a significant predictor of higher growth in dividends between t and 
t+1, and between t+1 and t+2. This confirms that the relationship between relatively high 
prices and high short-term dividend growth was significant, as would be suggested by 
standard asset pricing theory, which implies that investors had a degree of foresight in their 
valuations of railway shares during this period. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
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For longer term changes in dividends, the effect of the dividend yield is reversed, with the 
dividend yield having a positive and significant relationship with dividend changes between 
t+3 and t+4, and t+4 and t+5, which may suggest that investors were mistaken about longer 
term changes in dividends. This suggests a lack of long-term foresight, which may help to 
explain why asset prices rose and fell, rather than incorporating all future growth into their 
calculations from the beginning. 
These results suggest that investors during the Railway Mania incorporated short-term future 
dividend fluctuations into their valuations, but they were unable to forecast longer-term 
changes. This represents a possible explanation for why the prices of railway shares rose and 
fell during the Railway Mania. Investors during the boom responded to expectations of short-
term increases in dividends, and did not forecast the longer-term declines, leading them to 
raise prices. When investors eventually did revise their expectations, and began to forecast 
lower dividends, prices began to fall. This implies that the myopic nature of investor 
expectations may have played an important role in the development and bursting of the 
Mania. 
6 Consistency of Pricing 
The previous section considered expectations, and suggested that investors during the 
Railway Mania had imperfect foresight with regards dividend changes. This section considers 
rationality in terms of procedure, and examines whether investors priced different assets 
consistently given their expectations. A cross-sectional regression for each week of the 
sample is used to estimate the relationship between the variables in Equation 1 at particular 
times during the Railway Mania. 
The log of the dividend yield (δ), is expressed as a function of future dividend growth (∆d), 
with differences in the discount rate approximated by the risk factors of beta (B), and size (S), 
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as shown in Equation 2. A dummy variable for the railways (R) is also included to reveal if 
there was a significant difference between the railways and non-railways.  
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛� + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
A cross-sectional regression is estimated for each week, with Table 3 reporting the 
coefficients and standard errors for regressions without the inclusion of any dividend growth 
variable, on selected weeks, as an example.  A regression for the start of the period, the last 
week of each year and for the peak in prices on August 8, 1845 is shown. This analysis was 
repeated for each of the 417 weeks of the sample period, with the last column reporting the 
number of weeks during which each variable was significant.  
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
Panel A of Table 3 reveals that when the variation in the log of dividend yields are analysed, 
without controlling for dividend growth, and using the beta calculated using the non-railways 
as the market portfolio, the railway dummy was significant for 168 weeks. This consists of 80 
weeks when the railway dummy was significantly less than zero, which in this specification 
implies a relatively higher price, and 88 weeks when the railway dummy was significantly 
greater than zero, implying a relatively lower price.  
To estimate the extent of mispricing whenever future dividend growth has been accounted 
for, the cross-sectional regressions have been extended by the inclusion of varying numbers 
of future changes in dividends. In Panel A of Table 4 the number of weeks that each variable 
was significant when explaining the log of the dividend yield is reported. The next year of 
dividend growth was significant for between 253 and 379 weeks, depending on the number of 
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future changes included, with the second year of dividend growth significant for between 217 
and 262 weeks. Longer-term growth measures are significant on a relatively small number of 
weeks. The number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant declines from 168 
weeks to between 56 and 61 weeks, when one or two years of dividend growth are controlled 
for. 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
Table 5 analyses the number of weeks that the railway dummy was significant, by year, and 
considers whether this implied that the railways were overpriced or underpriced, given that 
the other variables had been controlled for. The railways were estimated to be overpriced 
during a particular week when the railway dummy was significantly less than zero, and 
underpriced when the railway dummy was significantly greater than zero. Results are shown 
for the number of weeks of overpricing and underpricing when varying numbers of years of 
dividend growth are accounted for. 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
When no future dividend growth was controlled for, the railways appear to have been 
significantly overpriced for 80 weeks, which represented 19.2 per cent of the full sample 
period. This implies that a simplistic comparison of dividend yields would lead to the 
conclusion that the railways were not priced consistently with the non-railways for a 
sustained period during the Railway Mania. However, when two years of dividend growth are 
included this apparent overpricing is entirely eliminated, with the railway dummy implying 
zero weeks of overpricing. 
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Panel A of Figure 7 illustrates this result, and shows that when the next two years of dividend 
growth are considered, the coefficient of the railway dummy remains very close to zero 
throughout the boom in prices, and is never significantly less than zero. These results imply 
that if investors were basing their valuations on their expectations of short-term dividend 
growth, they priced railway assets consistently for almost the entire duration of the Railway 
Mania. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 7 >> 
If longer-term dividend growth is considered, the apparent overpricing of the railways 
reappears. For example, when variables accounting for growth up to six years ahead are 
included, the railway dummy suggests that the railways had a significantly higher price than 
the non-railways for 41 weeks of the sample. These results imply that when short-term 
dividend changes are considered, the railways were priced consistently with the non-railways, 
but when longer-term changes are controlled for, the railways may have been overpriced for a 
substantial period.  
When the beta was estimated based on a market portfolio consisting of both railways and 
non-railways, the railway dummy was much less likely to be significant when no future 
dividend growth was included, as shown in Panel B of Tables 3 and 4, and Table 6, showing 
the lack of power of the railway dummy using this specification. When calculating beta with 
the railways representing a major component of the market index, the relationship between 
the railways and the market portfolio appears stronger, and beta becomes a proxy for 
differences between the industries. This leads to a multicollinearity problem when both beta 
and the railway dummy are included in the same regression, making it less likely the railway 
dummy will be significant. However, the key results of importance remain the same. 
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Consistent with the other specification of beta, the railways are not overpriced at all during 
the boom when two years of dividend growth are included, but overpricing reappears when 
longer term dividend growth is included. Regardless of which specification of beta is used, 
the results support the hypothesis that railway and non-railway assets were priced 
consistently when short-term dividend growth is considered, but not when longer-term 
changes are included. 
Given our ex-post view of what happened to longer-term dividends we may be led to the 
conclusion that investors had no justification for their actions. However, the ex-ante situation 
of investors, who saw that dividends were rising, and successfully forecast that they would 
continue to rise in the short-term, was very different. Given their expectations, based on the 
available information, they believed they were pricing the railways consistently with other 
assets. This suggests that their behaviour may be best described as myopic, but rational. 
7 New Railways 
The previous sections have analysed the asset price reversal which took place amongst the 
established railways, but there was also a substantial number of new railways promoted, 
many of which were listed on the stock market. These companies had to obtain Parliamentary 
authorisation for their route, construct their lines, and begin operating, before they could earn 
revenues. This process generally took several years, meaning that during the promotion boom 
none of these new companies did, nor could be expected to, pay dividends. This makes their 
relative valuation more difficult.  
An additional complication is that the shares in these new companies were paid in 
instalments, whereby investors made a small initial deposit and then paid the remaining 
‘calls’ when capital was required for construction. The instalment structure of these shares 
meant that investors were purchasing a leveraged asset, which often magnified returns, 
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especially during the first day of trading. Dale et al. (2005) has shown that these partially paid 
shares can be modelled as future contracts. The price of an equivalent fully paid share can be 
calculated by taking the price of the partially paid share and adding the discounted sum of 
future calls. Similarly, the par value of an equivalent fully paid share can be calculated by 
taking the par value of the partially paid share and adding the discounted sum of future calls. 
This makes it possible to calculate the price/par ratio of equivalent fully paid shares.  
The price/par ratio is an imperfect measure of valuation as it does not take account of 
differences in the dividends and growth of each company. However, it can be used as a basic 
approximation as it standardises prices by a common measure, the amount of capital which 
has been invested in the company. Table 7 shows the price/par ratio, at the end of each year 
and at the peak in prices, of established railways which were paying a dividend, of 
established railways which were not paying a dividend, and of the new railways. The 
discounted sum of calls has been calculated assuming that all calls were paid at the end of the 
sample period in 1850, using a discount rate of 3 per cent, which was close to the yield on 
Consols, and an approximation for the risk-free rate. Robustness tests suggest that the results 
are not sensitive to either the timing of calls or the value of the discount rate. 
 << INSERT TABLE 7 >> 
The results suggest that the new railways were not overpriced, with their price/par ratio being 
substantially lower than that of the established dividend-paying railways throughout the 
period. Similarly those established railways which were not paying a dividend had a much 
lower price/par ratio than those which were paying dividends. This provides further evidence 
that investors were pricing assets consistently, with those companies which were younger, 
riskier and not paying a dividend being given lower valuations. The changes in price/par 
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ratios also suggest that the prices of the new railways tended to move with those of the 
dividend-paying railways, suggesting that their prices were also influenced by the myopic 
expectations which investors had of the established railways. 
8 Sources of Myopia 
The results discussed in the previous sections suggest that during the boom phase of the 
Railway Mania, investors were unable to predict the eventual declines in dividends which 
would later occur. To place the changes of the Mania in context, the longer run trends in 
railway dividends are shown in Figure 8. The dividend rates of all railways listed in the 
Course of the Exchange, and the supplementary tables of the Railway Times, have been 
collected on an annual basis, and aggregated to calculate the dividend/par ratio of the railway 
industry. Average dividend rates are shown for when those young railways which had never 
paid a dividend thus far are excluded, and when they are included. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 8 >> 
8.1 Dividend History 
Panel A of Figure 8 shows that few of the railway companies established prior to the Mania 
had a long dividend history. The majority of the railways began paying dividends only in 
1840, just a few years before the Mania began. This suggests that investors could not base 
their expectations for each company on their historical record of dividend payment. 
The dividend history of those companies which had been paying dividends during the 1830s, 
suggested that the railways could potentially earn high returns on capital. The average 
dividend rate throughout this decade had remained almost continually above 6 per cent, and 
had risen to over 7 per cent by 1840, as shown in Panel B of Figure 8. The Liverpool and 
Manchester had sustained a rate of between 9 and 10 per cent continually since 1835. It was 
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only when the younger companies began paying dividends in the early 1840s that the average 
fell. However, it would have been plausible that when these younger companies matured, 
their dividends would also rise.  
The short dividend history of the railways was a possible source of investor myopia. The 
majority of railways had been in operation for just a few years, and those which had been 
operating for longer tended to pay high dividends. It was therefore not unrealistic for 
investors to expect dividends to rise, as they went on to do until 1847.  
8.2 Economic Environment 
The Economist (November 8, 1845, p.1109) had argued that whatever affected trade 
inevitably affected the traffic on the railways. Panel A of Figure 9, plots the relationship 
between annual changes in the dividend/par ratio of the railways, and GDP growth from 1832 
to 1870 from Mitchell (2003, p.905-907). The changes in these variables indicate that there 
was a positive association between railway dividends and economic growth over the long-
term, and Granger Causality tests imply that there was a significant relationship. It is 
therefore possible that investor expectations may have been affected by changes in the 
economy.     
<< INSERT FIGURE 9 >> 
In the 1840s the British economy was still largely dependent on agriculture, and the state of 
the money market often varied with the abundance of the harvests. The substantial crops of 
1842-44 increased the wealth of the public and the capital available for investment, 
contributing to the boom. The downturn in asset prices beginning in October 1845 was 
associated with a potato blight and defective harvest which led to an economic downturn, the 
repeal of the Corn Laws, and the Irish Famine. The Bank of England also raised its discount 
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rate in October and November 1845, from 2.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent, in an attempt to steady 
the volume of gold being exported in payment for grain. These changes occurred rapidly, and 
would have been difficult to predict just a few months earlier, with the first references to the 
blight occurring in the Dublin Freeman’s Journal on September 11, 1845, and the Belfast 
Newsletter on September 12, 1845. When investors did realise the problem in October 1845, 
share prices fell considerably.  
These initial problems were compounded by the Commercial Crisis of 1847 during which 
many merchants failed, and trade suffered (Evans, 1849). Panel A of Figure 9 confirms that 
the late 1840s saw a sharp decline in both economic output and the dividends paid by the 
railways. Investors may have been able to forecast that an economic downturn would 
eventually arrive, but it would have been difficult for them to predict the severity of the 
problems which occurred in the latter half of the 1840s. 
8.3 Expansion of Railways 
A more permanent cause of the declines in railway dividends was the overexpansion in the 
railway network which resulted from the construction of lines projected during the Mania. 
The rise in railway share prices during the boom was followed by a dramatic increase in the 
promotion of new routes. Although Parliament only authorised a fraction of the promoted 
lines the length of track open increased from 2,057 miles in 1843, to 6,123 miles in 1850 
(Mitchell, 2003, p.674). Panel B of Figure 9, suggests that there was a negative relationship 
between the opening of new railway track, and the change in railway dividends, and Granger 
Causality tests confirm there was a significant relationship. During both the earlier 
promotional boom of the 1830s, and the Railway Mania of the 1840s, a sharp increase in 
railway mileage was associated with declines in dividends. 
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Casson (2009) has suggested that the construction of the railway network was inefficient, 
compared to a counterfactual, with excessive duplication of lines. The most immediate 
impact of this duplication was to expose the established railways to the threat of competition, 
encouraging them to project their own lines. These new routes tended to earn lower returns 
than the original trunk lines. For example, a Committee of Inquiry into the York and North 
Midland Railway found that those parts of its network authorised before the Mania were 
yielding 7.0 per cent, those authorised in 1845 were yielding just 0.6 per cent, and those 
authorised in 1846 less than 0.1 per cent (Railway Times, November 3, 1849, p.1117).  
The volume of railway construction was useful to the economy in terms of the social savings 
which accrued from shorter journey times (Leunig, 2006), but it was not beneficial to railway 
shareholders. Panel B of Figure 9 illustrates that the peak in the opening of new railway track 
in 1848, coincided with the most dramatic falls in railway dividends. During the subsequent 
two decades the rises in dividends were modest and rates barely returned to their pre-Mania 
levels. Previous research has suggested that returns on capital employed (Crafts, Leunig and 
Mulatu, 2008), and dividends (Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts, 2011, p.815) continued to 
remain low in the period prior to the First World War1.   
Investors may have found it difficult to predict how successful the newly promoted routes 
would be ex-ante, and how many new lines would be authorised. The promotion boom 
reached its peak immediately prior to the November 1845 deadline for the submission of 
proposals to Parliament, and coincided almost exactly with the market crash in railway share 
prices. This suggests that when investors realised the extent of expansion which would occur, 
they revised their expectations. 
                                                 
1 Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) have suggested that British railway securities would not have had any place in 
an optimal portfolio immediately prior to the First World War, but Mitchell, Chambers and Crafts (2011) have 
found that low share prices, producing high dividend yields, would have led to quite attractive returns between 
1870 and the late 1890s, but not thereafter. 
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8.4 Heterogeneity of Opinion 
The heterogeneity of media reporting may have been another source of myopia during the 
boom. The Economist and The Times were both sceptical of the Mania, and wrote a number 
of editorials which raised concerns about the number of new railway companies which were 
being promoted. The first analysis from the Economist came in April 1845, when they argued 
that the amount of new railway construction which had been proposed would divert capital 
from other uses, and have damaging consequences for the economy (Economist, April 5, 
1845, p.310). The Times’ negative commentary began in July 1845 with a similar concern, 
when they asked ‘whence is to come all the money for the construction of the projected 
railways?’ (The Times, July 1, 1845, p.4). However, this negative reporting did not have an 
immediate effect, with further price increases and an even greater rate of new company 
promotion for several months thereafter. 
A possible reason for the lack of impact was that there was another section of the media, 
namely the railway-specific periodicals, which remained positive and provided heterogeneity 
of opinion. Even when the crash in prices did come in October 1845 the Railway Times 
maintained that it provided an opportunity to ‘get the possession of valuable stock at reduced 
prices’ (Railway Times, October 18, 1845, p.1961). Although investors could have 
appreciated that railway coverage by the railway press could have been biased, the 
fundamental factors appeared to support their views. The dividends paid by the established 
railways continued to increase, and would do so until 1847. With heterogeneity amongst the 
media, investors were required to form their expectations based on other factors, which 
contributed to their myopia. 
8.5 Fraudulent Accounting 
Another possible error of investors was to rely on dividends which were actually the result of 
accounting manipulation. Bryer (1991, p.456) has suggested that some companies may have 
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stopped including depreciation in their accounts in order to raise dividends, in an attempt ‘to 
lure the naive into investing in railways’. There was considerable evidence of malpractice 
amongst companies which had been controlled by one chairman, George Hudson. However, 
Committees of Inquiries into other companies found little evidence of any major problems, 
and Arnold and McCartney (2003) have argued that the perception of widespread malpractice 
is more myth than reality. 
The reason that investors may have trusted the dividends was that they had traditionally been 
a signal of firm performance. During the boom there was little suggestion of malpractice, and 
the first real evidence did not appear until 1849. This was almost four years after the peak in 
share prices, when allegations of fraud were made against Hudson, and share prices fell 
further as a result of this.  
There were several sources of myopia which could have affected investor expectations during 
the Railway Mania. The expansion of the railway network, and changes in economic 
conditions were probably most influential, but the short dividend history of most railways, 
the heterogeneity of opinion in the media, and fraudulent accounting may have played some 
role. In each case the initial myopia of investors is understandable, as the extent of the 
changes was not clear at first. When investors did receive more information they responded 
by lowering prices, thus ending the boom of the Railway Mania. 
9 Relationship to other Theories 
Although myopic rationality may be the primary explanation for the development of the 
Railway Mania, it is possible that some other theories of asset price reversals may explain 
part of its development. A common explanation for ‘bubble’ episodes is that investors 
suffered from some form of irrational exuberance, as discussed by Shiller (2005). Irrational 
exuberance implies that investor expectations were not related to reality, whilst the myopic 
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explanation suggests that expectations were plausible, given the available information at the 
time, but that investors lacked foresight of longer-term changes. The evidence presented in 
the previous sections on the pricing of the established railways, and of the newly promoted 
railways, suggests that investor expectations were based on dividend growth which actually 
occurred, implying that irrational exuberance would not be an accurate description of investor 
expectations at this time. 
A more recent explanation for the development of asset price reversals is the technological 
revolution hypothesis of Pastor and Veronesi (2009). This theory suggests that when there is 
a large scale adoption of a new technology, it leads to an increase in systematic risk, and 
therefore a decline in share prices for new technology firms. This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with myopic rationality, but the empirical predictions of the technological 
revolution hypothesis do not seem to be consistent with the British Railway Mania. The 
theory predicts that volatility and beta should both peak when railway shares reach their 
lowest point, which occurred in April 1850. However, Figure 2 suggests that volatility peaked 
in 1845 and 1848, and Table 1 implies beta also rose in 1844 and 1845, by whichever 
measure of beta is used. The technological revolution hypothesis also entirely fails to explain 
why dividends changed so dramatically during this period.  
Speculation for short term capital gains, sometimes referred to as ‘riding the bubble’, has 
been discussed by Blanchard and Watson (1983) and Temin and Voth (2004). This suggests 
that although some investors expected prices to decline eventually, they still invested because 
they hoped they could sell to a ‘greater fool’. Although this may be an accurate description of 
some investors, this theory cannot explain the initial price increases which began the bubble, 
nor why the bubble does not immediately collapse given that everyone knows that it must 
collapse soon. Consequently, although some investors may have speculated for short-term 
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capital gains, it was the myopia of other investors which was responsible for beginning and 
sustaining the price increases during the Railway Mania. 
Limited arbitrage is another possible explanation for why a bubble can persist, as suggested 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Abreu and Brunnerheimer 
(2003). This theory argues that informed investors may believe that prices are too high, but 
are unable to short stocks effectively, meaning they cannot sell assets which they do not own. 
This implies that some investors are pessimistic whilst others remain optimistic. The theory 
of limited arbitrage may help to explain why some investors who had greater foresight had 
little impact during the boom of the Railway Mania, but myopia explains why many investors 
retained their high expectations and continued to raise prices to their peak. 
10 Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive dataset of share prices and dividends for the established railways and 
non-railways which traded during the British Railway Mania, this paper has found that 
investors may have had myopic foresight, meaning that it was short-term in nature. An 
analysis of the relationship between the current dividend yield and future dividend growth 
suggests that investors incorporated short-term dividend changes into their valuations, but not 
longer-term changes. 
A cross-sectional analysis, which considered whether the railways had a relatively higher 
price than the non-railways, suggests that when no future growth is accounted for, the 
railways appear to have been overpriced for a considerable period during the boom. 
However, when short-term future changes in dividends are included the apparent overpricing 
is entirely eliminated. When longer-term changes are considered the overpricing is evident 
again. These results suggest that investors had myopic rationality, meaning that although their 
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expectations were only accurate in the short-term, they acted in a utility maximising manner 
by pricing different assets consistently given those expectations. 
The myopic nature of investor expectations was due to the short history of dividend payouts 
on which to base forecasts, heterogeneity of opinion amongst the media, and the inability of 
investors to predict changes in economic conditions, the rapid expansion of the railway 
network, and some instances of accounting manipulation. In each case, these developments 
would have been difficult to accurately predict ex-ante, which explains why the boom 
occurred initially. It was only when new information became available that investors revised 
their expectations, and railway share prices declined. 
The finding that investors had myopic foresight may suggest that regulators could 
successfully intervene if they had greater foresight than other market participants. However, 
Bernanke (2002) has argued that this is questionable, and it may therefore be impractical to 
expect regulators to be able to forecast and prevent financial instability ex-ante, when 
investors cannot. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Companies by Industry on Selected Dates 
             
   Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850 
             
Number of 
Companies 
Established Railways N 19 22 21 22 21 19 18 21 15 18 
Non-Railways N 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 22 22 
             
Dividend 
Yield (D/P) 
Established Railways Mean 5.64% 3.58% 3.59% 3.15% 3.73% 4.65% 5.89% 6.75% 6.28% 3.65% 
 St. Dev. 2.42% 1.34% 1.03% 1.12% 1.10% 1.30% 1.49% 1.70% 3.01% 0.92% 
            
 Non-Railways Mean 4.75% 4.61% 4.35% 4.26% 4.74% 5.02% 5.15% 5.48% 4.94% 4.84% 
  St. Dev. 1.00% 1.01% 1.16% 1.04% 1.62% 2.20% 1.43% 1.99% 1.93% 1.61% 
             
Log of 
Dt+1/Dt 
(∆dt+1) 
Established Railways Mean -11.64% 9.61% 22.26% 12.06% 23.68% -6.76% -11.21% -36.07% -37.64% 21.62% 
 St. Dev. 35.50% 37.42% 55.64% 48.61% 48.13% 28.75% 23.40% 49.48% 52.74% 25.86% 
            
 Non-Railways Mean 9.75% 0.75% -2.14% 1.89% -0.97% 0.46% -2.26% -0.76% 3.04% -3.59% 
  St. Dev. 32.35% 2.66% 7.10% 5.37% 9.28% 10.23% 7.15% 17.92% 17.73% 13.49% 
             
Size in 
£millions  (S) 
Established Railways Mean 1.44 1.38 1.55 1.87 2.01 2.48 4.14 4.82 5.03 5.90 
 St. Dev. 1.03 1.05 1.21 1.45 1.52 2.03 3.85 4.49 5.38 5.47 
             
 Non-Railways Mean 1.72 1.72 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.77 1.77 1.75 1.76 
  St. Dev. 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.14 3.21 3.21 3.15 3.15 
             
Beta (BN) 
using market 
portfolio of 
non-railways 
Established Railways Mean 0.35 0.46 0.49 2.50 2.52 0.32 0.94 0.90 1.60 0.58 
 St. Dev. 0.81 1.07 1.47 1.83 1.82 1.29 0.70 2.04 1.44 1.99 
            
Non-Railways Mean 0.71 0.71 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.44 0.43 0.32 0.61 1.31 
  St. Dev. 1.62 1.62 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.81 0.85 0.48 1.90 4.19 
             
Beta (BNR) 
using market 
portfolio of 
non-railways 
and railways 
Established Railways Mean 1.52 1.73 2.17 1.84 1.57 1.34 1.61 1.33 1.90 2.50 
 St. Dev. 1.64 2.45 1.29 1.31 1.25 1.22 1.11 2.05 1.57 1.59 
            
Non-Railways Mean 0.75 0.75 0.28 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.11 0.26 0.22 
  St. Dev. 1.86 1.86 0.45 0.19 0.19 0.32 0.36 0.26 0.74 1.00 
             
Notes: Source data from the Railway Times and Course of the Exchange. Dividend Yield (D/P) calculated as dividends per share/share price. Dividend growth (∆dt+1) calculated as the log of the change in dividends during the 
subsequent year. Size (S) measued in terms of par value of equity. Beta (B) estimated by  regressing the weekly returns of each asset minus the risk free rate, against the weekly returns of the non-railway market portfolio minus the 
risk free rate. 
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Table 2: Yearly Entity Fixed Effects Panel Regressions using Future Growth 
in Dividends as Dependent Variable 
 
Panel A: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways 
 Dividend Growth between years 
 t and t+1 t+1 and t+2 t+2 and t+3 t+3 and t+4 t+4 and t+5 t+5 and t+6 
       
δt -0.860*** -0.212** -0.056 0.382** 0.217*** 0.023 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.088) (0.148) (0.055) (0.069) 
BNt 0.004 -0.029 -0.016 -0.050* 0.010 0.026* 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.014) 
St -0.016* -0.014 0.014 0.027** 0.027*** 0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Constant -2.648*** -0.611* -0.212 1.078** 0.490*** -0.073 
 (0.299) (0.303) (0.287) (0.490) (0.176) (0.215) 
       
Observations 190 164 157 147 142 138 
Companies 48 41 40 36 34 34 
Overall-R2 0.548 0.054 0.010 0.214 0.136 0.050 
       
Panel B: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways and Railways 
 Dividend Growth between years 
 t and t+1 t+1 and t+2 t+2 and t+3 t+3 and t+4 t+4 and t+5 t+5 and t+6 
       
δt -0.875*** -0.194* -0.002 0.380** 0.222*** 0.024 
 (0.095) (0.105) (0.068) (0.153) (0.053) (0.071) 
BNRt -0.042 0.066 0.125*** 0.033 0.013 -0.044 
 (0.032) (0.056) (0.043) (0.032) (0.016) (0.034) 
St -0.012 -0.023** -0.001 0.017 0.027*** 0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Constant -2.641*** -0.652** -0.222 1.006** 0.487*** 0.018 
 (0.278) (0.316) (0.210) (0.449) (0.173) (0.243) 
       
Observations 190 164 157 147 142 138 
Companies 48 41 40 36 34 34 
Overall-R2 0.558 0.069 0.120 0.183 0.136 0.059 
       
Notes: δ=Log of Dividend Yield, BN=Beta using market portfolio of non-railways, BNR=Beta using market portfolio of non-
railways and railways, S=Size. One observation per company at the end of each year of the sample. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3: Cross-sectional Regressions on Selected Weeks using Log Dividend Yield as Dependent Variable 
Panel A: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways 
 Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850 
 Total No. of 
Weeks Sig. 
             
R 0.115 -0.335*** -0.242** -0.369** -0.297* -0.055 0.090 0.227** 0.280* -0.280**  168 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.173) (0.162) (0.093) (0.093) (0.104) (0.155) (0.113)   
BN 0.010 -0.047* -0.009 0.004 0.018 -0.101 0.029 -0.010 -0.025 -0.006  3 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.082) (0.036) (0.036) (0.065) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.020)   
S -0.019* -0.006 -0.011 0.001 -0.013 -0.004 0.011 0.001 -0.016 -0.003  6 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008)   
Constant -3.046*** -3.053*** -3.142*** -3.185*** -3.079*** -3.010*** -3.031*** -2.953*** -3.024*** -3.056***  417 
 (0.069) (0.052) (0.060) (0.060) (0.073) (0.088) (0.069) (0.074) (0.086) (0.064)   
             
Obs. 41 44 43 44 43 41 39 42 37 40  17,412 
R2 0.052 0.191 0.098 0.197 0.121 0.113 0.100 0.130 0.114 0.189  0.056 
Panel B: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways and Railways 
 Jan 6, 1843 Dec 29, 1843 Dec 27, 1844 Aug 8, 1845 Dec 26, 1845 Dec 25, 1846 Dec 31, 1847 Dec 29, 1848 Dec 28, 1849 Dec 27, 1850  Total No. of Weeks Sig. 
             
R 0.104 -0.290** 0.058 -0.158 -0.212 0.035 0.075 0.235** 0.171 -0.127  50 
 (0.103) (0.117) (0.216) (0.164) (0.149) (0.122) (0.102) (0.098) (0.180) (0.093)   
BNR 0.010 -0.034* -0.159 -0.117* -0.032 -0.066 0.022 -0.012 0.083 -0.075*  47 
 (0.033) (0.018) (0.140) (0.063) (0.052) (0.070) (0.060) (0.030) (0.054) (0.040)   
S -0.019* -0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.032** 0.002  29 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010)   
Constant -3.046*** -3.062*** -3.123*** -3.179*** -3.077*** -3.058*** -3.023*** -2.956*** -3.033*** -3.056***  417 
 (0.070) (0.053) (0.062) (0.061) (0.076) (0.087) (0.065) (0.075) (0.085) (0.061)   
             
Obs. 41 44 43 44 43 41 39 42 37 40  17,412 
R2 0.054 0.199 0.231 0.267 0.122 0.034 0.097 0.131 0.142 0.261  0.106 
             
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is reported for selected weeks of the sample, with no dividend growth variable included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown in final column. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, BN=Beta using 
market portfolio of non-railways, BNR=Beta using market portfolio of non-railways and railways, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛�+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
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Table 4: Number of Weeks during which Variables are Significant from 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Panel A: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways 
R 168 56 61 102 108 104 106 
BN  3 31 39 78 102 87 74 
S 6 28 63 86 97 72 90 
(∆d) t+1  253 333 360 371 379 363 
(∆d) t+2   217 233 262 248 235 
(∆d) t+3    169 175 179 167 
(∆d) t+4     81 95 144 
(∆d) t+5      82 98 
(∆d) t+6       89 
Cons. 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
        
Ave Obs. 41.8 38.7 36.9 35.9 34.8 34.2 33.5 
Obs. 17,412 16,138 15,388 14,976 14,525 14,249 13,974 
Ave. Adj R2 0.056 0.287 0.402 0.487 0.530 0.543 0.530 
        
Panel B: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways and Railways 
R 50 40 44 55 59 54 51 
BNR  47 60 57 37 48 57 42 
S 29 60 86 97 106 94 103 
(∆d) t+1  273 335 357 366 367 359 
(∆d) t+2   216 204 219 239 216 
(∆d) t+3    140 157 171 152 
(∆d) t+4     78 95 140 
(∆d) t+5      90 106 
(∆d) t+6       78 
Cons. 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
        
Ave Obs. 41.8 38.7 36.9 35.9 34.8 34.2 33.5 
Obs. 17,412 16,138 15,388 14,976 14,525 14,249 13,974 
Ave. Adj R2 0.106 0.322 0.417 0.486 0.529 0.543 0.529 
        
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 was calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of years of dividend 
growth included. The total number of weeks that a variable is significant is shown for each specification. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, 
d=Log of Dividend, B=Beta, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛�+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
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Table 5: Estimates of the Number of Weeks of Over and Under Pricing of Railway Shares between 1843 and 1850 using 
Railway Dummy from Dividend Yield regressions, with Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways 
 
                  
 
No. of Years 
of Future 
Changes in 
Dividends 
Included 
Overpriced or 
Underpriced 
 
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 
 
Total  
Relative to 
n=0 
 
Total  
(% of 
sample) 
Relative to 
n=0 (%  
of sample) 
                  
 
n = 0 Overpriced 
 
7 37 20 12 0 0 0 4 
 
80 - 
 
19.2% - 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 48 28 12 
 
88 - 
 
21.1% - 
                  
 
n = 1 Overpriced 
 
0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
7 -73 
 
1.7% -17.5% 
  
Underpriced 
 
2 0 0 0 0 19 0 28 
 
49 -39 
 
11.8% -9.4% 
                  
 
n = 2 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -80 
 
0.0% -19.2% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 0 1 0 1 6 8 38 
 
61 -27 
 
14.6% -6.5% 
                  
 
n = 3 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
 
2 -78 
 
0.5% -18.7% 
  
Underpriced 
 
11 18 1 0 0 6 17 47 
 
100 12 
 
24.0% 2.9% 
                  
 
n = 4 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 
 
5 -75 
 
1.2% -18.0% 
  
Underpriced 
 
33 2 0 0 0 21 9 38 
 
103 15 
 
24.7% 3.6% 
                  
 
n = 5 Overpriced 
 
0 0 9 11 0 0 0 0 
 
20 -60 
 
4.8% -14.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
27 1 0 0 0 14 8 34 
 
84 -4 
 
20.1% -1.0% 
                  
 
n = 6 Overpriced 
 
0 13 16 12 0 0 0 0 
 
41 -39 
 
9.8% -9.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
10 0 0 0 0 15 4 36 
 
65 -23 
 
15.6% -5.5% 
                   
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of years of dividend growth included. The railways are estimated to be overpriced during a particular week 
when the railway dummy (𝛽𝛽4) is significantly less than zero, as this implies that railways had a significantly lower dividend yield than non-railways during that week, when future dividend growth is controlled for. 
Conversely they are estimated to be underpriced when the coefficient of the railways dummy was significantly higher than zero. The total weeks of overpricing and underpricing for each year were then calculated. 
δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, BN=Beta using market portfolio of non-railways, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛�+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Number of Weeks of Over and Under Pricing of Railway Shares between 1843 and 1850 using 
Railway Dummy from Dividend Yield regressions, with Beta based on Market Portfolio of Non-Railways and Railways 
 
                  
 
No. of Years 
of Future 
Changes in 
Dividends 
Included 
Overpriced or 
Underpriced 
 
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 
 
Total  
Relative to 
n=0 
 
Total  
(% of 
sample) 
Relative to 
n=0 (%  
of sample) 
                  
 
n = 0 Overpriced 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2 - 
 
0.5% - 
  
Underpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 48 0 0 
 
48 - 
 
11.5% - 
                  
 
n = 1 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -2 
 
0.0% -0.5% 
  
Underpriced 
 
4 7 0 2 1 14 0 12 
 
40 -8 
 
9.6% -1.9% 
                  
 
n = 2 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 -2 
 
0.0% -0.5% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 11 0 1 0 3 0 22 
 
44 -4 
 
10.6% -1.0% 
                  
 
n = 3 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
1 -1 
 
0.2% -0.2% 
  
Underpriced 
 
13 22 0 0 0 2 0 17 
 
54 6 
 
12.9% 1.4% 
                  
 
n = 4 Overpriced 
 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
1 -1 
 
0.2% -0.2% 
  
Underpriced 
 
28 3 0 0 0 14 0 13 
 
58 10 
 
13.9% 2.4% 
                  
 
n = 5 Overpriced 
 
0 0 5 6 1 0 0 0 
 
12 10 
 
2.9% 2.4% 
  
Underpriced 
 
25 0 0 0 0 11 0 6 
 
42 -6 
 
10.1% -1.4% 
                  
 
n = 6 Overpriced 
 
0 11 18 5 0 0 0 0 
 
34 32 
 
8.2% 7.7% 
  
Underpriced 
 
7 0 0 0 1 5 0 4 
 
17 -31 
 
4.1% -7.4% 
                   
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample, with varying numbers of years of dividend growth included. The railways are estimated to be overpriced during a particular week 
when the railway dummy (𝛽𝛽4) is significantly less than zero, as this implies that railways had a significantly lower dividend yield than non-railways during that week, when future dividend growth is controlled for. 
Conversely they are estimated to be underpriced when the coefficient of the railways dummy was significantly higher than zero. The total weeks of overpricing and underpricing for each year were then calculated. 
δ=Log of Dividend Yield, d=Log of Dividend, BNR=Beta using market portfolio of non-railways and railways,, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
 
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛�+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
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Table 7: Price/Par Ratios of Established Railways and New Railways 
 
 
Established Railways 
Which Paid a Dividend  
Established Railways 
Which Did Not  
Pay a Dividend  
New Railways 
 N Price/Par  N Price/Par  N Price/Par 
Jan 6, 1843 19 1.02  3 0.55  0 - 
Dec 29, 1843 22 1.25  4 0.59  0 - 
Dec 27, 1844 21 1.50  2 0.89  39 1.06 
Aug 8, 1845 21 1.80  3 1.08  71 1.14 
Dec 26, 1845 21 1.60  2 1.08  115 1.05 
Dec 25, 1846 18 1.36  3 1.11  100 1.01 
Dec 31, 1847 17 1.12  0 -  76 0.89 
Dec 29, 1848 20 0.88  0 -  60 0.74 
Dec 28, 1849 15 0.70  4 0.43  59 0.66 
Dec 27, 1850 18 0.77  3 0.49  46 0.67 
         
Notes: Source data from Railway Times and Course of the Exchange. The price of an equivalent fully paid share has been calculated by 
taking the price of each partially paid share and adding the discounted sum of future calls. The par value of an equivalent fully paid share 
has been calculated by taking the par value of the partially paid share and adding the discounted sum of future calls. The discounted sum 
of calls has been calculated assuming that all calls were paid at the end of the sample period in 1850, using a discount rate of 3 per cent, 
which was close to the risk-free rate on Consols. The price/par ratio of established railways which paid a dividend has been calculated as 
the sum of the market capitalisation of those railways divided by the sum of the par value of those railways. Price/par ratios of 
established railways which did not pay a dividend, and price/par ratios of the new railways have been calculated in the same manner for 
their respective companies. 
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Figure 1: Capital Gains Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data for railway share prices from Railway Times (1843-50), and for non-railway share prices from 
Course of the Exchange (1843-50). Established railways index includes those railways which were operating before 
January 1843 for which share price and dividend data is available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest 
non-railways by market capitalisation for which share price and dividend data is available. Capital gains for each 
company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices on a weekly basis. 
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Figure 2: Weekly Returns of  Established Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Source data for railway share prices from Railway Times (1843-50). Established railways include those 
railways which were operating before January 1843 for which share price and dividend data is available. Capital 
gains for each company weighted by market capitalisation to calculate weekly market return. 
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Figure 3: Industry Dividend/Par Ratio Amongst Established Railways and 
Non-Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data from Course of the Exchange (1843-50) and Railway Times (1843-50). Railway industry 
dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a percentage of total par 
value of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. Non-railway industry 
dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a percentage of total par value of 
non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 4: Industry Dividend Yield of Established Railways and Non-
Railways, 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Source data from Course of the Exchange (1843-50) and Railway Times (1843-50). Railway industry 
dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by established railway companies as a percentage of total 
market capitalisation of established railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. Non-
railway industry dividend/price ratio calculated as total dividends paid by non-railway companies as a percentage of 
total market capitalisation of non-railway companies for which share price and dividend data is available. 
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Figure 5: Total Return Indices for Established Railways and Non-Railways, 
1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Source data from Course of the Exchange (1843-50) and Railway Times (1843-50). Half-yearly dividend 
assumed to be made in equal payments in each week. Total return, as measured by the sum of capital gains and 
dividends, for each company weighted by market capitalisation to produce market indices. Established railways index 
includes those railways which were operating before January 1843 for which share price and dividend data is 
available. Non-railways index includes the twenty largest non-railways by market capitalisation for which share price 
and dividend data is available. 
  
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850
In
de
x 
L
ev
el
Established Railways
Non-Railways
46 
 
 
Figure 6: Correlation between Log of Dividend Yield and  
Dividend Growth between t and t + 1 year, for Railway Companies, 1843-50 
 
 
 
 
Notes: n=191, Correlation coefficient = -0.650. Source data from Course of the Exchange (1843-
50) and Railway Times (1843-50). One observation shown per company at end of December in 
each year between 1843 and 1850.  
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Figure 7: Impact of Railway Dummy on Log of Dividend Yield from Repeated Weekly Cross-sectional Regressions 
Controlling for Two Years of Dividend Growth, 1843-50 
 
Panel A: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio 
of Non-Railways 
Panel B: Using Beta based on Market Portfolio  
of Non-Railways and Railways 
  
 
 
 
Notes: A regression estimating Equation 2 is calculated for each week of the sample. Dividend growth from variables from t to t+1, and from t+1 to t+2 included in regression. Value of the coefficient represents the 
value of 𝛽𝛽4 from Equation 2 in any given week, with a 95 per cent confidence interval constructed using robust standard errors. δ=Log of Dividend Yield, ∆d=Dividend Growth, B=Beta, S=Size, R=Railway Dummy. 
For week = t 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�∆𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛�+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀 (2) 
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Figure 8: Dividends Paid by Railway Companies, 1832-70 
 
 
Panel A: Number of Railway Companies Panel B: Average Dividend/Par Ratio of Railways 
  
 
 
 
Notes: Source data on dividends from Course of the Exchange and Railway Times. Railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid on ordinary shares by railway companies as a percentage of total 
par value of railway companies for which dividend data is available. One observation per year. ‘Including Never-Paid’ reports results for all railway companies including those which have never previously paid a 
dividend. ‘Excluding Never-paid’ reports results for all railway companies excluding those which have never previously paid a dividend. Shaded area illustrates the period 1843-50 on which the rest of the paper is 
based. The sample begins in 1832, with the first dividend payment by the first major railway, the Liverpool and Manchester. Two minor lines, the Stockton and Darlington and the Forest of Dean were also paying 
dividends at this time. 
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Figure 9: Changes in Dividends, GDP Growth and Railway Mileage Open, 1832-70 
 
 
Panel A: Change in Dividends and GDP Growth Panel B: Change in Dividends and Mileage Open 
  
 
 
 
Notes: Source data on dividends from Course of the Exchange and Railway Times. Railway industry dividend/par ratio calculated as total dividends paid by railway companies as a percentage of total par value of 
railway companies for which dividend data is available, excluding those which have never previously paid a dividend. The change in the dividend/par ratio is calculated as the change since the previous year. GDP 
growth using constant prices calculated from Mitchell (2003, pp.905-907), and Change in Mileage calculated from Mitchell (2003, pp.674) . Granger Causality tests indicate that GDP growth Granger-Causes changes 
in dividends at 1% significance, and Change in Mileage Granger-Causes changes in dividends at 5% significance, when lags are selected using the Akaike Information Criteria. 
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